Exam objective

CEH

Hacking Mobile Platforms

This objective sits in Mobile Platform, IoT, and OT Hacking, which carries 10% of the CEH exam. The questions below are original, written from the official objective title above, and each explanation cites the EC-Council page it rests on.

Objective title verbatim from the official objectives. EC-Council exam page ↗

A worked example

Shown solved, with the whole explanation open: this is what every question here carries.

Mobile Platform, IoT, and OT Hacking

An organization loses an iPhone that stores sensitive records. Management wants to know whether a lab could try passcodes at machine speed from attached equipment. What limits this?

Passcode verification runs inside the application processor kernelVerification happens inside the Secure Enclave, well away from the main kernel.
Attempt counters reset each time the device is powered offPower cycling changes nothing; the counter and its delays persist across restarts.
Guesses only count when sent from the paired Secure EnclaveCorrect · your answerCorrect.
The device exports a passcode verifier to attached equipmentNo verifier leaves the device, which is exactly why off-device guessing fails.

Correct.

Checked against support.apple.com, September 2026

Concept

Binding a credential check to one piece of silicon removes an attacker's ability to copy the check elsewhere. Guess rate then depends on hardware the defender owns, not on the attacker's compute budget.

Why C

The Secure Storage Component releases lockbox entropy only to its paired Secure Enclave, so attempts injected by outside equipment never test the real passcode, and passing the attempt limit erases the protected data.

Source

To access the user data, the paired Secure Enclave needs to derive the correct passcode entropy value from the userʼs passcode and the Secure Enclaveʼs UID. The user's passcode can't be learned using unlock attempts sent from a source other than the paired Secure Enclave. If the passcode attempt limit is exceeded (for example, 10 attempts on iPhone), the passcode-protected data is erased completely by the Secure Storage Component.

Apple, The Secure Enclave, checked September 2026
#ios#secure-enclave

Now you: practice questions

No account needed. The explanation opens when you answer.

Sample question 1 of 3

Mobile Platform, IoT, and OT Hacking

A technician enters several wrong passcodes on a managed iPad and is locked out for fifteen minutes. The technician reboots the iPad immediately. What happens to the delay?

Sample question 2 of 3

Mobile Platform, IoT, and OT Hacking

A user reports a stolen iPhone protected by a six digit passcode. The risk owner wants to know why copying its flash storage to a cracking rig would not help. Which fact explains it?

Sample question 3 of 3

Mobile Platform, IoT, and OT Hacking

A forensic analyst images a locked iPhone thirty seconds after the screen turned off. Files written as Class A, Complete Protection, stay unreadable. Which mechanism explains that?

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Read the sources

These are the official pages the questions above cite. Reading them is studying the objective from the primary source, which is what the explanations point you toward anyway.

More objectives in Mobile Platform, IoT, and OT Hacking